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Executive Summary 
Selection of RPS for a given mission depends on many factors, including the ability to meet science 
requirements and ease of design integration, policy, schedule, cost, and risk. The goal of this study was to 
determine how much each of those factors influence the decisionmaking process and if any stand out 
more than others. Based on the analysis of the data collected, in general, electrical power subsystem 
(EPS) cost appears higher for RPS systems than it does for solar systems. Through conducting case 
studies, it seems that unique mission design and planned science have the greatest impact on the selection 
of RPS. Among five separate cases, there was no common reason for the choice of power source; 
however, primary decision factors included: cost, availability of RPS, and planetary protection. One 
prominent example is the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission, which has been enabled by RPS, as 
solar-powered systems did not meet mission requirements due to sunlight and thermal constraints. In 
addition to the data analysis and case studies, development of MOEs was also undertaken. This resulted in 
two MOEs: one based on cost of RPS versus solar, and one based on science mission cost-effectiveness 
(SMCE). Using the first MOE, analysis shows that RPS is most cost-effective for outer-planet orbiter 
missions (to Saturn and beyond). Utilizing the second MOE shows that, even at a higher cost, RPS 
enables large missions with multiple instruments operating over a long operating life, and therefore 
provides substantial science value.  This MOE assessment also shows that science value for RPS is higher 
per mission. However, SMCE of RPS versus solar is similar when looking at a large set of missions. 
Given the overall results of this study, it can be concluded that, if the cost of RPS were reduced and 
performance enhanced, RPS systems could be more readily adoptable for a broader range of missions. 
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1. Introduction
At the request of the Radioisotope Power Systems (RPS) Program Office at the NASA Glenn Research 
Center (GRC), The Aerospace Corporation (Aerospace) performed a study of spacecraft power system 
heritage. The primary goal of the study was to investigate the historical decisionmaking process behind 
choosing either a solar-based or RPS-based power system for planetary missions. The study was 
conducted as a multiphase effort. Phase I focused on feasibility, where cursory data exploration was 
conducted and it was determined whether there was sufficient data to support further work. Phase I 
concluded with a workshop at NASA GRC, where continuation to Phase II was approved. Phase II 
consisted of detailed data collection, case studies, and measure of effectiveness (MOE) development. The 
final results of Phase II were presented at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 
(JHU/APL) to members of the NASA RPS Program Office and the RPS Surrogate Mission Team (SMT). 
The final results of this study have been captured in this report, which is available for full and open 
release. Additionally, a full briefing package provides the same details of this document. This briefing 
package includes an appendix that includes data not for public release, which was used to provide detailed 
answers to questions raised during this study. The results of these inquiries are discussed in this 
document, but the proprietary data is not included. Finally, an executive summary package is also 
publicly available, which was used to present the results of the study at the 2018 Aerospace Space Power 
Workshop. 
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2. Data Collection Overview/Trends
2.1 Data Collection Overview 
Initial data collection targeted 16 RPS missions (Table 1) and 18 solar missions (Table 2). To make the 
data collection task manageable and most relevant to the current time frame, collection for solar missions 
was limited primarily to those launched since 2000, with a few exceptions. Data collection for RPS 
missions however, was expanded to all years, as there are many fewer RPS missions than solar. Table 3 
shows the data parameters the study sought to collect. These parameters included a mix of cost, technical, 
and other qualitative parameters, which were meant to provide context about each mission and be used in 
data analysis and MOE development.  
The primary sources for the data include the NASA Cost Analysis Data Requirements (CADRe) reports, 
original documents from the missions, the NASA Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM), and other official 
open-source documentation such as project websites or published papers. Most qualitative data about the 
missions was easily obtained. For example, the science objectives and nominal mission duration 
parameters were 100% populated for all missions. Most technical data was also found in CADRe or other 
sources. For example, solar array area was available 89% of the time, power generation mass was 
available 91% of the time, spacecraft wet mass was available 94% of the time, and spacecraft dry mass 
was available 97% of the time. Cost data availability was the most challenging aspect for many missions. 
For example, spacecraft bus cost was available 83% of the time, power subsystem cost was available 77% 
of the time, and power generation cost was available 17% of the time.  
Some individual missions had data availability and other unique aspects about them that led to them being 
dropped from the database. The Apollo missions had no reliable source of information available. Ulysses 
had many foreign contributions, and power subsystem data was not available. The Mars Exploration 
Rover (MER) missions were also excluded, since they are difficult to categorize as they used solar for 
power and radioisotope heater units (RHUs) for thermal management. Mars Odyssey EPS cost is also 
much lower than all others, but it is not understood why.  
The remaining data set with power subsystem cost includes 7 RPS missions and 18 solar missions. For 
RPS, the missions include Cassini, Galileo, MSL, New Horizons, Voyager, Pioneer, and Viking. Note 
that Voyager 1/2, Pioneer 10/11, Viking 1/2 are counted as one spacecraft each; although they are 
separate missions, the designs are identical, and it did not make sense for the individual spacecraft to be 
counted separately for many of the metrics. The missions that these spacecraft flew, however, were 
unique, and the operational months of each are considered for the SMCE metric. For solar, the missions 
include CONTOUR, Dawn, Deep Impact, Genesis, GRAIL, Juno, Kepler, LADEE, LCROSS, LRO, 
Magellan, Mars Odyssey, MAVEN, MESSENGER, MGS, MRO, OSIRIS-Rex, and Phoenix. 
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 Table 1.  RPS Missions 
 
 
Table 2.  Solar Missions 
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 Table 3.  Data Collection Parameters 
 
 
2.2 Data Collection Trends 
This study attempted to slice the data in a variety of different ways. From the various analyses performed, 
the three most salient metrics are presented. These include: EPS mass as a percentage of spacecraft bus 
mass, EPS cost as a percentage of spacecraft bus cost, and EPS subsystem cost per EPS subsystem mass 
(FY17$M cost per kilogram). From comparing RPS versus solar with these metrics, the following trends 
have been observed: 
• EPS mass as a percentage of spacecraft bus mass is comparable - RPS = 27%, Solar = 24% 
• EPS cost as a percentage of spacecraft cost is higher for RPS - RPS = 26%, Solar = 11% 
• EPS cost per EPS mass (FY17$M per kg) is higher for RPS - RPS = $0.91, Solar = $0.20 
The three plots shown in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 discuss these metrics in detail, with respect to 
the overall database. The spacecraft bus mass excludes the mass of any payload elements to draw a 
uniform comparison of each mission. The same is also true that the comparison of EPS cost and 
spacecraft bus cost also excludes any payload elements. On each of the three plots, the RPS mission 
names have been highlighted blue to distinguish them from solar missions. For the RPS missions, it is 
noteworthy that the mass includes all EPS subsystem elements as well as the RPS generation source, such 
as a radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG). The same is true of cost, as all costs including those of 
the Department of Energy (DoE) for RPS are included. This is important to understand, as individual 
NASA projects may consider the cost of an RPS system outside their own budget, as RPS is generally 
procured in a somewhat external fashion—much like NASA procures launch vehicles for individual 
science missions. However, the full costs of these elements have been included to draw a fair comparison 
of the full cost of solar versus RPS systems. 
In each of these three plots, the metric is plotted on the X-axis, with each of the data points (missions) 
ordered from least to greatest. On the Y-axis, a percent rank has been computed. This is a simple 
calculation of individual data point order/rank divided by the total number of data points (e.g., with 10 
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data points, data point 1 = 1/10 = 10% rank, data point 2 = 2/10 = 20% rank…). Plotting the data in this 
manner provides a sense of how the calculated average compares to all the individual data points in the 
data set, and generally results in an S-shaped curve. 
Figure 1 shows the plot of the EPS mass as a percentage of the overall spacecraft bus mass. As can be 
seen here, the blue RPS missions are generally scattered throughout the plot. The average of the overall 
data set (red triangle), solar mission average (yellow square), and RPS mission average (green square) are 
clustered about the middle of the data set. As the solar average is 24% and the RPS average is 27%, this 
led to the conclusion that RPS and solar are comparable in terms of EPS mass as a percentage of the 
overall spacecraft bus mass. Also noteworthy, Pioneer 10/11 appears at the top end of this curve. It was 
the earliest unmanned RPS mission to explore the outer solar system. The overall spacecraft mass 
indicates it was relatively small compared to modern spacecraft, as the overall space vehicle mass was 
approximately 260 kg including the payload with the bus itself weighing approximately 192 kg. The EPS 
carried 4 SNAP-19 RTGs weighing 54 kg and with additional EPS components, bringing the total EPS 
mass to 91 kg—which constitutes almost half the bus mass. 
 
Figure 1.  EPS mass percentage of total spacecraft bus mass. 
Figure 2 shows a plot of the EPS cost as a percentage of the overall spacecraft bus cost. This plot reveals 
a different trend as compared to the mass in Figure 4, as the blue RPS missions are no longer scattered 
about the dataset—with most clustered at the top end. The RPS average is also at the top end of the curve, 
while the solar average is much farther down. This led to the conclusion that RPS cost as a percentage of 
spacecraft bus cost is much higher for RPS at 26%, versus solar at 11%. Notably, one data point that 
stands out at the top end of the curve is the New Horizons mission, for which the EPS cost constitutes 
almost 50% of the overall spacecraft bus cost. Investigation of this data point revealed that it is so much 
higher than others primarily because it is the only non-flagship mission to use an RPS system. Intended to 
control cost, New Horizons was procured as a cost-capped mission under the NASA New Frontiers 
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 program, while most of the other RPS missions were directed flagship-class missions, which tend to be 
costlier. When comparing the overall bus cost of New Horizons with the other missions in the dataset, it 
is in family with other cost-capped New Frontiers missions such as OSIRIS-Rex. Also, when comparing 
its EPS cost with other missions, it is also in family with the other flagship missions such as MSL. For 
these reasons, the percentage of EPS cost versus overall bus cost is much higher for New Horizons. The 
detailed data used in this investigation is also included in the non-public appendix to the chart package. 
 
Figure 2.  EPS cost percentage of total spacecraft cost. 
Finally, Figure 3 shows a plot of the EPS cost per EPS mass (FY17$M cost per kilogram). In this plot, the 
clearest break between RPS and solar is observed, as the blue RPS missions are all clustered at the top 
end of the curve (except for one solar mission). The solar missions are all clustered in a fairly vertical 
fashion at the bottom end of the curve. In this dataset, the average cost per kilogram for solar EPS was 
found to be $0.20 FY17$M, and RPS was found to be much higher at $0.91 FY17$M.   
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Figure 3.  EPS cost per EPS subsystem mass. 
This study also assessed trends by NASA center and mission class. The trends are similar to those for the 
overall dataset. However, most slices were too small to draw meaningful results. By Center, APL and 
Ames RPS had only one mission each (New Horizons and Pioneer 10/11, respectively). GSFC has flown 
no RPS missions to date. By mission class, all flagship-class missions are RPS, except for Magellan. 
Also, large-class RPS missions are only New Horizons and Pioneer 10/11. There are no medium-sized 
(Discovery) RPS missions. The details of these additional analyses are also contained in the non-public 
appendix. 
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 3. Case Studies 
3.1 Case Studies Overview 
Case studies with actual personnel were performed to get an understanding of the decisionmaking process 
to choose RPS or solar for flown and planned missions that considered the two architectures. This was 
intended to understand the trades and differences in operational complexity between RPS and solar.  
The missions identified RPS/solar decision:  
• RPS to solar: PSP and Europa Clipper 
• Solar to RPS: MSL 
• Trade space exploration: Juno and Europa Lander 
• RPS/solar operational complexity: MSL and MER 
This study developed a list of questions to inform/guide the interviews. Interviews were performed either 
in person or via phone with the following individuals: 
• MSL: Dave Woerner (JPL) and Loren Jones (JPL) - MMRTG Office Manager 
• MER: Dave Woerner (JPL) and Loren Jones (JPL) - MMRTG Office Manager 
• Europa Clipper: Greg Carr (JPL) 
• PSP: Jim Kinnison (APL) – Mission Systems Engineer 
• Europa Lander: Sam Thurman (JPL) – Project Manager 
• Juno: Scott Bolton (SwRI) – Principal Investigator 
Based on information gathered during the initial interviews, follow-up discussions on MSL and PSP on 
direction to use RPS were held with the following individuals: 
• MSL: Len Dudzinski (NASA HQ) – Program Executive 
• PSP: Ralph McNutt (APL) – Space Physicist 
Table 4.  Case Studies Overview 
Mission Background Decision Criteria 
Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) 
Launch: 2011 
Target: Mars 
Power Source: RPS – MMRTG 
• Studies started in 2000 for Mars 
Smart Lander 
• Wanted to consider a wide range 
of landing sites to look for water 
• RPS chosen primarily due to desire not to limit the 
landing site 
• Best choices for looking for water reside in higher 
latitudes of northern hemisphere 
• Solar only feasible at lower at lower latitudes  
Europa Clipper 
Launch: 2020’s 
Target: Europa (Jupiter) 
Power Source: Solar 
• Performed formal trade study 
evaluating 5 RPS, solar, and 
hybrid options 
• Cost 
• Not significantly enabling to perform mission 
• If cost and schedule criteria were eliminated RPS 
would have ranked highest 
Parker Solar Probe (PSP) 
Launch: 2018 
Target: Sun 
Power Source: Solar 
• Originally designed to swing by 
Jupiter and flyby the sun 
• At the time RPS was thought to be 
the only way 
• Cost reduction direction from NASA HQ 
• Solar presumed to be the cheaper option 
• Able to develop trajectory that used Venus flybys 
• Also guided by availability of plutonium for RPS 
Europa Lander 
Launch: 2020’s 
Target: Europa (Jupiter) 
Power Source: Batteries 
(Lander) / Solar (Carrier) 
• Performed a broad review of 
options for the both the carrier and 
the lander 
• Planetary protection was a primary concern due to 
possible effect on potential indigenous life 
• Heat from RPS could have melted ice creating 
unstable footing 
• RPS would have enabled increased surface time 
to do long-term science (e.g., seismometry) 
• Carrier followed decision made for Europa Clipper 
NASA/CR—2019-220039 8
  
Mission Background Decision Criteria 
Juno 
Launch: 2011 
Target: Jupiter 
Power Source: Solar 
• Baselined as an RPS mission 
given guidance of 2003 New 
Frontiers AO 
• Sought to demonstrate solar was a 
viable fallback given uncertainty of 
RPS development timeline 
• Assumed proposing RPS would lead to the 
mission not being selected if RPS would not be 
available on time 
• Would have preferred RPS as using solar at 
Jupiter is more operationally complex 
 
For the choice of power source, the discussion was focused on the decisionmaking process and not any 
difficulties encountered during development resulting from the decision. Table 4 provides a high-level 
summary of the individual case studies, and the details of each are included in the following sections. 
3.2 Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) 
 
Figure 4.  Mars Science Laboratory1. 
MSL Case Study Notes (Solar to RPS): 
• Studies started in 2000 for the Mars Smart Lander. In 2002, JPL was directed by NASA HQ to 
start looking at RTG, and a memorandum was signed with DOE.  
• MMRTG allowed for a wider range of landing sites, thus providing an opportunity for more 
science. Initially, it was thought to be +/- 60 degrees, but turned out to be limited to +/- 30 
degrees due to heating needs. 
• The use of RTG is size-dependent, which made sense for MSL, but not for MER or Mars 
Pathfinder. MER first sized power system and found, based on how the solar panels could be 
arranged on the top deck, that RTG was not needed—RTG was not worth the mass. 
• MSL started with 2 MMRTGs and solved the mass problem by descoping 1 unit. This was 
enabled by allowing greater battery depth of discharge (DOD). 
                                                 
1 Image Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech/MSSS, https://mars.nasa.gov/msl/multimedia/images/?ImageID=7658 
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• The impact to launch vehicle cost was thought to be $50M. However, this study could not find 
further breakdown of additional cost. 
• The launch pad integration was a big consideration, as MMRTG was integrated 7 days before 
launch.  Two doors were needed—1 for the launch vehicle and 1 for the aeroshell.  There was a 
complete backup power generator to ensure power would be available for cooling.  Mock-ups 
were built and practiced for a year in advance to check fit and work procedures. 
• The MMRTG was cooled during the 2-year launch delay to minimize power loss: 124 W fueled, 
with 114 W available on the surface.  
• The REMS instrument has an anemometer that can provide a false reading, since it sees the heat 
plume off the MMRTG. 
• The MMRTG heat plume provides some protection from dust, since only the heaviest dust goes 
through the plume to land on the radiator. 
• The choice of RPS for MSL was primarily driven by the desire not to limit the landing site 
potential. The goal was to look for water, and many of the best areas are in the northern 
hemisphere at the higher latitudes. RPS allows a much larger fraction of the surface to be 
considered.  Solar power limits landing sites to lower latitudes. RPS enabled the increased 
potential for science discovery. NEPA authorities (JPL & NASA HQ) required solar to stay on 
the table in order to be formally traded against RPS for NEPA documentation purposes. 
3.3 Mars Exploration Rover (MER) 
 
Figure 5.  Mars Exploration Rover (MER)2. 
                                                 
2 Image Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech, https://mars.nasa.gov/mer/gallery/artwork/rover3browse.html 
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 MER Case Study Notes 
• The solar panels restricted landing site choices. They needed +/- 5 degrees from the equator to 
receive reasonable power. 
• Dust on solar panels limits MER lifetime. MER goes into hibernation mode in the winter, since 
there is not enough power generated. 
• Thermal overnight is a really big issue, as solar panels need to make sure batteries are charged 
during the day to make sure enough heat can be generated at night. RTG could have provided 
heat overnight and allowed some instruments to take measurements at night, but the size of the 
RTG prohibited use on MER. 
3.4 Europa Clipper 
 
Figure 6.  Europa Clipper3. 
Europa Clipper Case Study Notes (RPS to Solar) 
• There was a formal trade study of 5 options: MMRTG, eMMRTG, 1 MMRTG + Solar, 1 
eMMRTG + Solar, and Solar – Rigid Flat Panel (RFP). This trade study was performed after 
solar power was determined to be feasible. The trade study had previously screened out ASRG 
and ROSA. There was no direction or influence of the project from the outside. It was determined 
that GPHS-RTG would have been ideal, given power-level and lifetime considerations. 
• The rationale for options included best combinations. All combinations seemed feasible for a 
2022 launch, with 2024 as backup. RTG was good for heat considerations. Solar was easy to 
control with more known delivery schedule and scalability. 
                                                 
3 Image Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech, https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/missions/web/europa_full.jpg 
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 • Other considerations included MMRTG (degradation, micrometeoroid susceptibility, and fuel 
production for 2022 launch) and eMMRTG (development schedule for 2024 launch). 
• A comprehensive system-by-system review was performed to determine whether RPS was a 
requirement to enable or significantly enhance development. In all cases, it was found that solar 
power would not be an impediment to successful development. 
• Figure 7 provides the summary of the power source trade study. The trade study considered 
technical, cost, schedule, reliability, and risk. It used both quantitative and qualitative 
assessments. Quantitative factors were weighted and scored. A sensitivity analysis was 
performed. The overall choice was Solar-RFP. 
• Figure 8 provides the criteria and weighting approach for this power source trade study. Figure 9 
provides the quantitative results summary. 
• Policy considerations are also important and were considered in the Europa Clipper trade 
- National Policy: 
“The United States shall develop and use space nuclear power systems where such systems 
safely enable or significantly enhance space exploration or operations capabilities.” 
 National Space Policy of the United States of America, June 28, 2010 
- Institutional Policy: 
 “The design shall avoid the use of nuclear materials (e.g. RHUs, RTGS) unless they are 
essential to mission viability or overwhelmingly cost-effective.” 
 JPL Design Principles, Section 4.1.8, “Use of Nuclear Materials” 
As an additional exercise, the weighting criteria used in the Europa Clipper (Figure 9) was revisited. 
Using these criteria, if cost and schedule categories were eliminated, the results show that eMMRTG 
would have been the preferred candidate.  
 
NASA/CR—2019-220039 12
  
 
Figure 7.  Europa Clipper Power Source Trade Study summary. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Europa Clipper Criteria and Weighting Approach for Power Source Trade Study. 
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Figure 9.  Europa Clipper Quantitative Results Summary for Power Source Trade Study. 
3.5 Parker Solar Probe (PSP) 
 
Figure 10.  Parker Solar Probe4. 
                                                 
4Image Credit: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/thumbnails/image/observingsunposter.jpg 
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 Parker Solar Probe Case Study Notes (RPS to Solar) 
• Initial PSP concepts at JPL and then at APL used RPS. The designers wanted to be able to go 
over the Sun’s poles. They used Jupiter flyby – single 14-hour pass at 4 solar radii, with 5-year 
Jupiter transit. 
• The APL PSP concept required 365 Watts. GPHS-RTG was not available, MMRTG was in 
development (engineering unit existed), and ASRG looked too far down the line. 
• In 2007, the SMD AA mandated that the cost be cut to 70% of current cost.  It was presumed that 
nuclear was too expensive and that savings could only be achieved with solar. It was also a 
concern that RTG would not be available. 
• The study to meet the mandate only looked at solar concepts. The decision was to use existing 
technology and figure out how to cool the subsystem. 
• Going solar required a trajectory change, from flying over the Sun’s poles to orbiting the equator. 
The PSP concept orbited around Venus, down to 9.8 solar radii. It was determined that the new 
orbit met all the science goals. 
• Numerous design features were implemented to accommodate solar power. Solar arrays were 
lowered as the spacecraft gets closer to the Sun to reduce power generation. Water was pumped 
under the solar arrays to actively cool them. Two giant radiators were placed behind the solar 
shield to cool the solar arrays, and a concentrator was laid over the solar arrays. 
• The solar arrays significantly complicated spacecraft thermal and GN&C. 
• The PSP was able to remove “dunce cap” solar shield, since not going as close to the Sun with 
solar. 
• RTG would have significantly reduced the mission complexity. It would have eliminated solar 
array cooling system and fault management to deal with hot and cold when near to and far from 
the Sun, respectively. 
• There were fewer launch opportunities with solar. The delay of 2015 launch pushed launch to 
2018. 
• In 2007, it was decided that RPS would not be used due to lack of plutonium, though the rationale 
was not explicit. APL originally baselined MMRTGs. The SMD AA provided direction to 
develop the PSP concept without RPS.  Work on multiple Venus flybys done for very early 
mission concepts was rediscovered. The limitation was that it did not allow for flying over the 
poles to get latitudinal variation.  The PSP ended up with a 9.86 solar-radii close approach: The 
spacecraft does not get as close to the Sun, but it gets more observation time at an acceptable 
distance, since the redesigned mission does not require flying out to Jupiter (4.5-year transit). 
• Not going as close to the Sun lessened the worry about the dust environment and improved the 
thermal concern. For thermal control, it did not need the primary thermal shield of the original 
concept; the secondary thermal shield was sufficient. 
• Venus flybys also allow for greater mission design flexibility. 
NASA/CR—2019-220039 15
  
3.6 Europa Lander 
 
Figure 11.  Europa Lander5. 
Europa Lander Case Study (Trade Study Exploration) 
• This study performed a broad review of options for the both the carrier and the lander. 
• The lander requires all-propulsive landing due to lack of atmosphere. There is a desire to keep 
mass at a minimum. Either MMRTG or eMMRTG were considered viable options, but there were 
issues of mechanical packaging due to size. The operating environment presented challenges. 
There was concern regarding a melting cryogenic surface creating unstable footing, since the 
MMRTG produces 2 kW of thermal energy. For planetary protection, the requirements were 
extremely stringent. NASA HQ planetary protection assumed that one germ to the surface would 
result in contamination of subsurface ocean. There was concern for radiation dose impact on 
potential indigenous organisms. It was assumed that the RPS concept was 1 MMRTG with 
batteries to support peak power. Solar concept was a non-starter. The array, which was twice the 
size of previous largest landed array, would only provide a couple of watts. 
• The carrier’s use of MMRTG would have provided significant mass savings. Per policy 
requirement, it was hard to argue that RPS would ‘enable or significantly enhance’ capabilities. 
Solar was demonstrated by Juno and planned for Europa Clipper. 
• Cost was an issue. There were numerous factors: accommodation, integration, NEPA compliance, 
and SLS certification. The cost impacts included:  SLS certification of $20M-$30M and a power 
subsystem delta cost of ~$200M, and the MMRTG lander would have total cost impact of 
~$500M. 
• The MMRTG had the benefit of increased surface lifetime. The limiting factor then becomes the 
radiation exposure of the carrier. A three to six-month surface stay would require development of 
                                                 
5Image Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/nasa-receives-science-report-on-europa-lander-concept 
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hardened electronics. The MMRTG would enable long-term science (e.g., seismometry), and the 
planned science could be met with batteries. 
• Batteries were the choice for the lander. The primary reason was planetary protection. There was 
concern about making sure RPS could meet stringent contamination requirements and not harm 
potential indigenous life. NASA SMD made the final decision. The project provided results of 
trades and provided some suggestions, and tried to stay even-handed and objective. 
3.7 Juno 
 
Figure 12.  Juno6 
Juno Case Study Notes (Trade Space Exploration) 
• The choice would have been to use RPS if it truly had been available. No older types were 
available, as they were committed to other missions. The last GPHS-RTG went to New Horizons. 
Solar was made to work. 
• There was no compromise in science with solar, but it complicated the design. There was a need 
to stay Sun-pointing the majority of the time. The design stayed simple and did not go with 
articulated arrays. Batteries were changed to support when pointing away from the Sun. 
Downlinking often required pointing away from the Sun. The spacecraft became larger due to the 
solar arrays. It required solar array development at additional cost. LILT testing was performed. 
Higher efficiency cells were examined, but the decision was to go with the best cells in the lot, 
which was costly. There was also concern with radiation and solar cell degradation, since the 
available lifetime is still not fully known. 
• The overall cost of using solar was in line with given RPS cost ($20M). It was planned to lower 
to 14 days orbit for prime science. The propulsion system was exhibiting anomalous behavior so 
did not lower, but stayed in the 53-day orbit. The mission can still complete all science, but it is 
taking longer. It must deal with the eclipse period, which would not be an issue with RPS. 
                                                 
6 Image Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech, https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/thumbnails/image/pia21771.jpg 
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 Instruments cannot see Jupiter’s whole orbit. This is the tradeoff of power versus instrument 
pointing.  If solar could not have supported the science, the mission would likely have proposed 
RPS to get the full science—and then see what would happen with the selection, as opposed to 
proposing solar with reduced science. 
• The mission conducted in-depth discussions on the selection of the power source for five 
missions: MSL, PSP, Europa Clipper, Europa Lander, and Juno. 
• The mission also looked at the impact to operations between similar missions using different 
power sources: MMRTG for MSL versus solar power for MER. 
• Case studies show that unique mission design and planned science have the greatest impact on the 
selection of RPS.  There does not appear to be a common reason for the choice of power source 
among the case studies. 
• RPS performs well when assessed for reliability and technically enabling qualities. 
• Policy, however, limits use of RPS. National policy allows it where “safely enables” or 
“significantly enhances.” JPL policy restricts to “essential for mission viability or 
overwhelmingly cost effective.” 
• Planetary protection of the operational environment was the determining factor for Europa 
Lander. 
• Cost was also a primary variable that lead to RPS not being selected, given that cost can be 
prohibitive. This was the primary decision choice for Europa Clipper, and influenced PSP and 
Europa Lander. 
• The availability and schedule risk also affected the selection. Headquarters redirected PSP away 
from RPS over concerns of lack of plutonium. Juno preferred RPS, but was concerned the delay 
of RPS development would have deemed the mission not selectable. 
• Missions like MSL, however, are enabled by RPS, as solar powered systems do not meet 
requirements due to sunlight or thermal constraints. 
NASA/CR—2019-220039 18
 4. MOE Discussion 
4.1 MOE Introduction 
The purpose of a potential MOE is to provide guidance, and ideally, would provide a clear indication that 
RPS is the best design choice for a given mission. The MOE should also be objective (i.e., there should 
not be weighting factors or other subjective input). An MOE should also be traceable to its inputs. 
Assuming that the MOE is calculated based on multiple inputs, each input should be clearly defined and 
defensible, and it should be clear how each input is used in the final calculation. An MOE should also be 
as comprehensive as possible. It should include all aspects of technical performance as well as cost when 
providing guidance. This study provided two MOEs, one based on cost of the EPS subsystem and another 
science value metric for comparison of the science merit of RPS versus solar missions. 
4.2 Cost of RPS versus Solar MOE 
One consideration is to look at the typical solar array EPS subsystem cost versus an RPS-based EPS 
subsystem cost, given a similar set of power and mission lifetime requirements. This study utilized 
collected data to develop EPS subsystem cost estimating relationships for solar and RPS subsystems. It 
used data to calculate the ratio of cost of solar to RPS to see if there is a “dark green zone” where cost for 
RPS is less than solar (solar/RPS > 1 = dark green). This study also looked at varied end-of-mission 
(EOM) power requirements for varied mission lifetimes. The results show influence of cost and 
performance on affordability of RPS. 
The underlying calculations were: 
• Solar array beginning-of-life (BOL) power requirement based on EOM power requirement 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸(1 − %𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀 ∗ � 1𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�2 
• RPS BOL requirement based on EOM requirement 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸(1 − %𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴)(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀 + 3 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓) 
• EPS subsystem cost derived from collected dataset 
- Function of solar array size and EOM power 
- Full cost of power generation and distribution 
• RPS cost based on the historical sources 
- Sources normalized to FY17$M 
- Total EPS cost estimated, based on ratio of total EPS to RPS cost from data set 
- Does not, however, consider other potential savings on spacecraft (e.g., thermal), as that is 
mission and spacecraft design specific 
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Figure 13.  RPS cost for a projected 2025 mission (FY15 $). 
 
Figure 14.  RPS performance data. 
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 Figure 13 provides the RPS cost for a projected 2025 mission. Figure 14 displays RPS performance data 
taken from “Outer Solar System: Many Worlds to Explore,” Outer Planets Assessment Group (OPAG) 
View of Decadal Survey Progress, May 2017. The cost and performance parameters for RPS systems 
were obtained from these sources for use in the MOE. Costs were inflated to FY17$M for use in the 
MOE. 
There are six steps in the calculation of the MOE: 
1. Calculate solar array BOL power requirement based on EOM power requirement & mission 
lifetime. 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸(1 − %𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀 ∗ � 1𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�2 
2. Calculate RPS BOL requirement based on EOM requirement & lifetime. 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸(1 − %𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴)(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀 + 3 𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀 𝑝𝑝𝑦𝑦𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀 𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓) 
3. Calculate solar array size based on BOL requirement. 
4. Calculate solar-based EPS subsystem cost based on solar array size and EOM power. 
5. Calculate RPS-based EPS subsystem cost based on # RTGs needed. 
6. Calculate the ratio of solar-based to RPS-based EPS subsystem 
- Solar/RPS < 0.8 = light green 
- Solar/RPS > 1 = dark green 
- 0.8 < x < 1 = medium green 
Figure 15 and Figure 16 present the results of the MOE comparison for the MMRTG RPS system. For 
each of the following figures, the top left quadrant provides an overview of the calculations of the MOE. 
The other three quadrants give the results of the MOE at various planetary destinations, where the power 
requirement is varied on the vertical axis and the mission lifetime is varied on the horizontal axis. These 
calculations pertain to orbiter missions, unless noted otherwise. Figure 15 shows the results of the MOE 
at Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. As can be seen by the presence of only the light and medium-green regions 
at all three destinations, this indicates that MMRTG only begins to be somewhat cost effective at Saturn 
versus solar. Figure 16 provides the results for a Lunar Lander, and at Uranus and Neptune. As seen here, 
MMRTG is not cost effective for a Lunar Lander, but is overwhelmingly cost effective at Uranus and 
Neptune.  
Similarly, Figure 17 and Figure 18 present the results of the MOE comparison for the Enhanced MMRTG 
or eMMRTG RPS system. Figure 17 shows the results of the MOE at Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Here, the 
results are similar to that of the MMRTG, but, with the improved performance of the eMMRTG, more 
darker green regions begin to appear at Saturn. Figure 18 provides the results for a Lunar Lander, and at 
Uranus and Neptune. The results seen here are the same as that of the MMRTG, with the eMMRTG not 
being cost effective for a Lunar Lander, but overwhelmingly cost effective for orbiter missions at 
destinations beyond Saturn. 
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Figure 15.  MOE results: MMRTG – Case 1 of 2. 
 
 
Figure 16.  MOE results: MMRTG – Case 2 of 2. 
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Figure 17.  MOE results: eMMRTG – Case 1 of 2. 
 
 
Figure 18.  MOE results: eMMRTG – Case 2 of 2. 
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Figure 19.  MOE Results: DRPS - Case 1 of 2. 
 
 
Figure 20.  MOE results: DRPS Case 2 of 2. 
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Finally, Figure 19 and Figure 20 present the results for the DRPS case. Figure 19 shows the results of the 
MOE at Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Here, the results are also similar to that of the eMMRTG, but again, 
with the improved performance of DRPS, even more darker green regions begin to appear at Saturn. 
Figure 20 provides the results for a Lunar Lander, and at Uranus and Neptune. The results seen here for 
DRPS are the same as that of the MMRTG and eMMRTG, as it is not cost effective for a Lunar Lander, 
but overwhelmingly cost effective for orbiter missions at destinations beyond Saturn. 
4.3 Landed Power Considerations 
MOEs for lander cases are much more complicated, as cost is not always the primary consideration. For 
some landed missions, sunlight and temperature constraints necessitated by science landing requirements 
make RPS systems the only viable implementation choice. For landed missions, power is required when 
the surface is in shadow. Additionally, landed missions typically require additional power to meet system 
minimum heating requirements when the surface is in shadow. RPS can survive long periods of darkness 
and operate at all times, as opposed to solar-based systems that would need to operate in a low-power 
mode to conserve energy until the solar array could again start generating power. 
4.4 Cost-Competitive RPS 
Similarly, the MOE can also be used to calculate the cost required to make RPS cost competitive. The 
graph below gives the RPS cost required for an RPS-based EPS subsystem cost to be equal to a solar-
based EPS subsystem at Jupiter or its moons. Note that this assumes NextGen RPS performance of 500 
watts and 1.9% annual degradation. It is understood, however, that science requirements may still 
necessitate the need for an RPS-based system. 
 
Figure 21.  Cost-competitive RPS. 
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4.5 Assessment of Science Value 
Quantifying science value can be a very difficult and subjective task. Preferably, it would somehow be 
quantified per dollar spent. The difficulty is in the determination of how science value be measured. Total 
quantity of data is different for different instrument types. Is an instrument that generates more data 
inherently more valuable? The number of images does not pertain to non-imaging instruments. Should 
one consider the number of published papers? Also, other subjective criteria cannot be easily quantified 
(e.g., number of “significant” findings). 
The approach used here to determine science value is to use “instrument-months.” This methodology has 
been used in two previous studies assessing the cost-effectiveness of small satellite and Category 3 
missions.7,8 Science data return can be represented by the number of instruments on a mission multiplied 
by the number of months the instrument operated. This assumes all instruments are included to answer 
specific scientific questions and therefore are of equal merit, although it is understood that this may not 
always be true. Instrument duration acts as surrogate for quantity and depth of information gathered.  
Figure 22 shows a comparison of the instrument-months for each mission with the RPS missions colored 
blue, and the solar missions colored orange. For all RPS missions, the total instrument months is 13,249, 
while the solar missions total 6,403 instrument months. 
 
Figure 22.  Science value instrument months comparison. 
                                                 
7 “Evaluating Small Satellites: Is The Risk Worth It?”, 1999 Small Satellite Conference.  
8  “Assessing the Benefits of NASA Category 3, Low Cost Class C/D Missions”, 2013 IEEE Aerospace Conference. 
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To look at the overall cost-effectiveness of RPS and solar missions, Science Mission Cost-Effectiveness 
(SMCE) is used. The equations are shown in Figure 23, and the steps are described herein: Divide 
instrument-months by cost, calculate mission-by-mission numbers for individual, comparison, calculate 
class numbers for RPS versus non-RPS class comparison. 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 =  𝐼𝐼∗𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇
  
• I = number of instruments flown 
• t = time (in months) of instrument operation 
• TMC = total mission cost 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 =  ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗=1
∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗
𝑀𝑀
𝑗𝑗=1
 
• N= number of missions 
• Ij = number of instruments flown on the jth spacecraft 
• Tj = time (in months) of instrument operation on the jth spacecraft 
• Tmcj = total mission cost for the jth spacecraft 
As an example, the steps for calculating the instrument-months and SMCE for the Mars Reconnaissance 
Orbiter (MRO) mission are as follows: 
• MRO has 8 instruments operating during its lifetime 
• MRO was transitioned to a stable orbit and began science operations in November of 2006 (est. 
11/15/2006) 
• MRO is still operating, after several extensions past its primary mission, and assumed to stop 
operating at the end of FY20 (i.e., 9/30/2020) at which point it will become primarily a 
communications relay for other Mars missions 
- This leads to an operating duration of the instruments of 166 months 
- Given its 8 instruments, the instrument month calculation would be: 8 instruments times 166 
months = 1328 instrument-months 
• MRO cost was $1,028 RY$M from launch to operations through FY20. Inflating to FY17$M 
results in total of $1,274M FY17$M. 
• SMCE is total I-M divided by total cost 
Comparing results for RPS (10) and non-RPS (16) missions show that the average number of instrument-
months per mission is higher for RPS (i.e., more science per mission), and the SMCE is similar. The 
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 average instrument-months per mission is 1656 for RPS missions versus 400 for non-RPS missions.  RPS 
missions typically enable a larger spacecraft with multiple instruments over a much longer operating time, 
thereby increasing the instrument-months over non-RPS missions. SMCE for all RPS missions, however, 
is 0.60 instrument-months per FY17$M versus 0.59 instrument-months per FY17$M for non-RPS 
missions. Table 5 shows the SMCE summary results. 
Table 5.  SMCE Summary Results 
 
Figure 23 shows the detailed results behind these calculations. Missions in which no data was taken due 
to a mission failure are included as zero instrument-months, while the cost is included in the calculation 
for the total mission class calculation. Sample return missions include ground-based investigations after 
return for a planned number of years; these investigations are treated in the same manner as space-borne 
instrument-months.  Data collected by in-situ instruments for flyby missions (i.e., Pioneer, Voyager) 
substantially influence the instrument-months calculation. 
 
Figure 23.  SMCE detailed results. 
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 5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study was conducted to better understand the decisionmaking process behind choosing RPS or solar 
power systems for planetary spacecraft. Based on the analysis of data collected, in general, EPS cost 
appears higher for RPS systems than for solar systems. Through case studies, it appears that unique 
mission design and planned science have the greatest impact on the selection of RPS. Among five 
separate cases, there was no common reason for the choice of power source; however, primary decision 
factors included: cost, availability of RPS, and planetary protection. One prominent example is the Mars 
Science Laboratory (MSL) mission, which has been enabled by RPS, as solar powered systems did not 
meet mission requirements due to sunlight and thermal constraints. MOE analysis shows that RPS is most 
cost effective for outer planet (to Saturn and beyond) orbiter missions. MOE analysis also shows that, 
even at a higher cost, RPS enables large missions with multiple instruments working over a long 
operating life—and therefore provides substantial science value.  This MOE assessment also shows that 
science value for RPS is higher per mission. However, science mission cost-effectiveness of RPS versus 
solar is similar when looking at a large set of missions. 
Although a substantial amount of cost data was found for this study, further details of that cost that allow 
for clearer interpretation of them are often desirable. To form a complete understanding of the cost impact 
to a mission from using an RPS power source, the delta cost to launch services should be clearly 
documented. As part of the data collection process, this study attempted to acquire the cost impact on 
launch services from having an RPS power source. However, this data could not be obtained, as it either 
was not available or was tied in with other costs and could not be isolated. The MOE analysis also 
provides insight into how RPS needs to be improved. Any new RPS system (whether NextGen, DRPS, or 
beyond) needs better performance (higher BOL and less degradation) and to be less expensive than 
MMRTG and eMMRTG. MOEs derived from this study could be further utilized to assess planetary 
targets to identify the ones where RPS is more enabling and/or cost effective. Targets could be assessed 
for cost, planetary protection, and other considerations. These could be used to identify the most 
reasonable RPS missions, and could generate a quick reference table to inform mission designers 
(effectively a “cheat sheet” for trade studies). 
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6. Acronyms 
AA Associate Administrator 
AO Announcement of Opportunity 
APL Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory 
ASRG Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator 
BOL Beginning of Life 
CADRe Cost Analysis Data Requirement 
CDR Critical Design Review 
CONTOUR COmet Nucleus TOUR 
CRP Constant Production Rate 
DoD Depth of Discharge 
DOE Department of Energy 
DRPS Dynamic RPS 
EIS Environmental Impact Statement 
eMMRTG Enhanced Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
EOM End of Mission 
EPS Electrical Power Subsystem 
FY Fiscal Year 
GN&C Guidance Navigation & Control 
GPHS-RTG General Purpose Heat Source-Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
GRAIL Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory 
GRC Glenn Research Center  
HQ Headquarters 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
I-M Instrument Months 
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
kW kilowatt 
LADEE Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer  
LCROSS Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite 
LILT low-intensity low temperature 
LRO Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
LSEP Lunar Surface Experiments Package 
LSP Launch Services Program 
MAVEN Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution 
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 MER Mars Exploration Rovers 
MESSENGER MErcury Surface, Space Environment, Geochemistry, and Ranging 
MGS Mars Global Surveyor 
MMOD Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris 
MMRTG Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
MOE measures of effectiveness 
MRO Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter 
MSL Mars Science Laboratory 
NAFCOM NASA Air Force Cost Model 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act 
NextGen Next Generation RTG 
OPAG Outer Planets Assessment Group 
OSIRIS-Rex Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, Security, Regolith 
Explorer 
PDR Preliminary Design Review 
PI Principal Investigator 
PSP Parker Solar Probe 
REMS Rover Environmental Monitoring Station 
RFP Rigid Flat Panel 
RHU Radioisotope Heater Unit 
ROSA Roll-Out Solar Array 
RPS Radioisotope Power System 
RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
S/C Spacecraft 
SLS Space Launch System 
SMCE Science Mission Cost-Effectiveness 
SMD Science Mission Directorate 
SNAP Systems Nuclear Auxiliary Power 
SOA State of the Art 
SRG Stirling Radioisotope Generator 
TE Thermoelectric 
TMC Total Mission Cost 
W Watt 
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